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Abstract
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs,
use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm,
which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing
amount of empirical evidence reveals that applicants misrepresent their preferences
when this mechanism is used. This paper shows that no mechanism that implements
a stable matching is obviously strategy-proof for any side of the market, a stronger
incentive property than strategy-proofness that was introduced by Li (2017). A stable
mechanism that is obviously strategy-proof for applicants is introduced for the case in
which agents on the other side have acyclical preferences.
Keywords: stable matching; obviously strategy-proof; obvious strategy-proofness; matching;
mechanism
JEL codes: D4, D47
1 Introduction
A number of labor markets and school admission programs that can be viewed as two-sided
matching markets use centralized mechanisms to match agents on both sides of the market
(or agents on one side of the market and objects on the other side of the market). One
important criterion in the design of such mechanisms is stability (Roth, 2002), requiring
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that no two agents, one from each side of the market, prefer each other over the partners
with whom they are matched. Another highly desired property is strategy-proofness, which
alleviates agents’ incentives to behave strategically.1
Indeed, many clearinghouses have adopted in recent years the remarkable deferred ac-
ceptance (DA) mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962),2 which finds a stable matching and is
strategy-proof for one side of the market, namely the proposing side in the DA algorithm
(Dubins and Freedman, 1981).3,4 Interestingly, although participants are advised that it is in
their best interest to state their true preferences, empirical evidence suggests that a signifi-
cant fraction nonetheless attempt to strategically misreport their true preferences (Hassidim
et al., 2017); this was observed in experiments (Chen and So¨nmez, 2006), in surveys (Rees-
Jones, 2016), and in the field (Hassidim et al., 2016; Shorrer and So´va´go´, 2017). This paper
asks whether one can implement the deferred acceptance outcome via a mechanism whose
description makes its strategy-proofness more apparent. Toward this goal, we adopt the
notion of obvious strategy-proofness, an incentive property introduced by Li (2017) that is
stronger than strategy-proofness.
Li (2017) formulated the idea that it is “easier to be convinced” of the strategy-proofness
of some mechanisms over others. He introduces, and characterizes, the class of obviously
strategy-proof mechanisms. He shows that, roughly speaking, obviously strategy-proof mech-
anisms are those whose strategy-proofness can be proved even under a cognitively limited
proof model that does not allow for contingent reasoning.5 In his paper, Li studies whether
various well-known auction and assignment mechanisms with attractive revenue or welfare
properties for one side of the market can be implemented in an obviously strategy-proof man-
ner. Whether one may implement stable matchings in an obviously strategy-proof manner
remained an open problem.
For the purpose of this paper, we adopt the Gale and Shapley (1962) one-to-one matching
market with men and women to represent two-sided matching markets; our main results
naturally extend to many-to-one markets such as labor markets and school choice programs.
When women’s preferences over men are perfectly aligned, the unique stable matching may
be recovered via serial dictatorship, where men, in their ranked order, choose their partners.
In this case, a sequential implementation of such serial dictatorship is obviously strategy-
proof. (This follows from Li (2017), who shows that in a two-sided assignment market with
agents and objects, serial dictatorship, when implemented sequentially, is obviously strategy-
1See also Pathak and So¨nmez (2008), which finds that non-strategy-proof mechanisms favor sophisticated
players over more na¨ıve players.
2Examples include the National Resident Matching Program (Roth, 1984), as well as school choice pro-
grams in Boston (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005) and New York (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2009) (see also Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003).
3This mechanism is also approximately strategy-proof for all participants in the market (Immorlica and
Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Ashlagi et al., 2017b).
4Indeed, removing the incentives to “game the system” was a key factor in the city of Boston’s decision
to replace its school assignment mechanism in 2005 (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2006).
5For instance, this notion separates sealed-bid second-price auctions from ascending auctions (where
bidders only need to decide at any given moment whether to quit or not) and provides a possible explanation
as to why more subjects have been reported to behave insincerely in the former than in the latter (Kagel
et al., 1987).
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proof.6) Generalizing to allow for weaker forms of alignment of women’s preferences, we
show that if women’s preferences are acyclical (Ergin, 2002),7 then the men-optimal stable
matching can be implemented via an obviously strategy-proof mechanism. While the obvious
truthfulness of the basic questions that we use to construct this implementation (questions
of the form “do you prefer x the most out of all currently unmatched women?”) draws from
the same intuition upon which the serial dictatorship mechanism is based, the questions are
considerably more flexible, and the order of the questions more subtle.
The main finding of this paper is that for general preferences, no mechanism that imple-
ments the men-optimal stable matching (or any other stable matching) is obviously strategy-
proof for men. We first prove this impossibility in a specifically crafted matching market
with 3 women and 3 men, in which women have fixed (cyclical) commonly known preferences
and men have unrestricted private preferences. It is then shown that for the impossibility
to hold in any market, it is sufficient for some 3 women to have this structure of preferences
over some 3 men. Moreover, the same result holds even if women’s preferences are privately
known. An immediate implication of these results is that in a large market, in which women’s
preferences are drawn independently and uniformly at random, with high probability no im-
plementation of any stable mechanism is obviously strategy-proof for all men (or even for
most men). These results apply to school choice settings even when schools are not strategic
and have commonly known priorities over students. For example, unless schools’ priorities
over students are sufficiently aligned, no mechanism that is stable with respect to students’
preferences and schools’ priorities is obviously strategy-proof for students.
This paper sheds more light on fundamental differences between two-sided market mech-
anisms that aim to implement a two-sided notion such as stability, and closely related two-
sided market mechanisms that aim to implement some efficiency notion for one of the sides of
the market. First, as noted, in assignment markets there exists an obviously strategy-proof
ex-post efficient mechanism (serial dictatorship). Second, a variety of ascending auctions,
from familiar multi-item auctions (Demange et al., 1986) to recently proposed clock auctions
(Milgrom and Segal, 2014), maximize welfare or revenue and are obviously strategy-proof,
despite the latter’s being based on deferred acceptance principles. In contrast, this paper
shows that there is no way to achieve stability that is obviously strategy-proof for either side
of the market.
Obvious strategy-proofness was introduced by Li (2017), who studies this property ex-
tensively in mechanisms with monetary transfers. In settings without transfers, Li (2017)
studies this property in implementations of serial dictatorship and top trading cycles. Several
papers further study this property in different settings. Closely related is Troyan (2016), who
studies two-sided markets with agents and objects and asks for which priorities for objects
one can implement in an obviously strategy-proof manner the Pareto-efficient top trad-
6Since, after selecting an object, the agent quits the game, no contingent reasoning is needed in order to
verify that she must ask for her favorite unallocated object. However, serial dictatorship (the same strategy-
proof social choice rule), when implemented by having each agent simultaneously submit a ranking over
all objects in advance, is not obviously strategy-proof. This example and the example in Footnote 5 both
demonstrate that whereas strategy-proofness is a property of the social choice rule, obvious strategy-proofness
is a property of the mechanism implementing the social choice rule.
7A preference profile for a woman over men is cyclical if there are three men a, b, c and two women x, y
such that a x b x c y a.
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ing cycles algorithm. Pycia and Troyan (2016) characterize general obviously strategy-proof
mechanisms without transfers under a “richness” assumption on the preferences domain, and
characterize the sequential version of random serial dictatorship under such an assumption
via a natural set of axioms that includes obvious strategy-proofness. Bade and Gonczarowski
(2017) constructively characterize Pareto-efficient social choice rules that admit obviously
strategy-proof implementations in popular domains (object assignment, single-peaked pref-
erences, and combinatorial auctions). It is worth noting that all three of these papers utilize
machinery and observations that originated in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model and background, in-
cluding the definition of obvious strategy-proofness in matching markets. Section 3 presents
special cases for which an obviously strategy-proof implementation of the men-optimal sta-
ble matching exists. Section 4 provides the main impossibility result. Section 5 presents
corollaries in a model where women also have private preferences. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Two-sided matching with one strategic side
For the bulk of our analysis it will be sufficient to consider two-sided markets in which
only one side of the market is strategic. We begin by defining the notions of matching and
strategy-proofness in such markets.
In a two-sided matching market, the participants are partitioned into a finite set of
men M and a finite set of women W . A preference list (for some man m) over W is a totally
ordered subset of W (if some woman w does not appear on the preference list, we think of
her as being unacceptable to m). Denote the set of all preference lists over W by P(W ). A
preference profile p¯ = (pm)m∈M for M over W is a specification of a preference list pm over W
for each man m ∈M . (So the set of all preference profiles for M over W is P(W )M .) Given
a preference list pm for some man m, we write w m w′ to denote that man m strictly prefers
woman w over woman w′, (i.e., either woman w is ranked higher than w′ on m’s preference
list, or w appears on this list while w′ does not), and write w m w′ if it is not the case that
w′ m w.
A matching between M and W is a one-to-one mapping between a subset of M and a
subset of W . Denote the set of all matchings between M and W byM. Given a matching µ
between M and W , for a participant a ∈ M ∪W we write µa to denote a’s match in µ, or
write µa = a if a is unmatched.
A (one-side-querying) matching rule is a function C : P(W )M → M, from preference
profiles for M over W to matchings between M and W .
A matching rule C is said to be strategy-proof for a man m if for every preference profile
p¯ = (pm)m∈M ∈ P(W )M and for every (alternate) preference list p′m ∈ P(W ), it is the
case that Cm(p¯) m Cm(p′m, p¯−m) according to pm.8 C is said to be strategy-proof if it is
strategy-proof for every man.
8As is customary, (p′m, p¯−m) denotes the preference profile obtained from p¯ by setting the preference list
of m to be p′m.
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2.2 Obvious strategy-proofness
This section briefly describes the notion of obvious strategy-proofness, developed in great
generality by Li (2017). We rephrase these notions for the special case of deterministic
matching mechanisms with finite preference and outcome sets. For ease of presentation,
attention is restricted to mechanisms under perfect information; however, the results in this
paper still hold (mutatis mutandis) via the same proofs for the general definitions of Li
(2017).9
Whereas strategy-proofness is a property of a given matching rule, obvious strategy-
proofness is a property of a specific implementation, via a specific mechanism, of such a
matching rule. A mechanism implements a matching rule by specifying, roughly speaking,
an extensive-form game tree that implements the standard-form game associated (where
strategies coincide with preference lists) with the matching rule, where each action at each
node of the extensive-form game tree corresponds to some set of possible preference lists for
the acting participant. We now formalize this definition.
Definition 1 (matching mechanism). A (one-side-querying extensive-form) matching mech-
anism for M over W consists of:
1. A rooted tree T . The nodes/vertices of the tree are denoted by V (T ). The edges of
the tree are denoted by E(T ) and are directed away from the root: if an edge e is
incident with a node n but is not on the path from the root of the tree to n, then e is
outgoing from n. The leaves (nodes with no outgoing edges) of the tree are denoted
by L(T ) ⊂ V (T ).
2. A map X : L(T )→M from the leaves of T to matchings between M and W .
3. A map Q : V (T ) \ L(T )→M , from internal nodes of T to M .
4. A map A : E(T ) → 2P(W ), from edges of T to predicates over P(W ), such that all of
the following hold:
• Each such predicate must match at least one element in P(W ).
• The predicates corresponding to edges outgoing from the same node are disjoint.
• The disjunction (i.e., set union) of all predicates corresponding to edges outgoing
from a node n equals the predicate corresponding to the last edge outgoing from a
node labeled Q(n) along the path from the root to n, or to the predicate matching
all elements of P(W ) if no such edge exists.
A preference profile p¯ ∈ P(W )M is said to pass through a node n ∈ V (T ) if, for each
edge e along the path from the root of T to n, it is the case that pQ(n′) ∈ A(e), where n′ is
the source node of e. That is, the nodes through which p¯ passes are the nodes of the path
9Readers who are familiar with the general definitions of Li (2017) may easily verify that if a randomized
stable obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanism exists, then derandomizing it by fixing in advance each
choice of nature to some choice made with positive probability yields a deterministic stable OSP mechanism.
Furthermore, if some stable mechanism is OSP under partial information, then it is also OSP under perfect
information.
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that starts from the root of T and follows, from each internal node n′ that it reaches, the
unique outgoing edge whose predicate matches the preference list of Q(n′).
Definition 2 (implemented matching rule). Given an extensive-form matching mecha-
nism I, we denote by CI , called the matching rule implemented by I, the (one-side-querying)
matching rule mapping a preference profile p¯ ∈ P(W )M to the matching X(n), where n is
the unique leaf through which p¯ passes. Equivalently, n is the node in T obtained by travers-
ing T from its root, and from each internal node n′ that is reached, following the unique
outgoing edge whose predicate matches the preference list of Q(n′).
Two preference lists p, p′ ∈ P(W ) are said to diverge at a node n ∈ V (T ) if there exist
two distinct edges e, e′ outgoing from n such that p ∈ A(e) and p′ ∈ A(e′).
Definition 3 (obvious strategy-proofness (OSP)). Let I be an extensive-form matching
mechanism.
1. I is said to be obviously strategy-proof (OSP) for a man m ∈M if for every node n with
Q(n) = m and for every p¯ = (pm′)m′∈M ∈ P(W )M and p¯′ = (p′m′)m′∈M ∈ P(W )M that
both pass through n such that pm and p
′
m diverge at n, it is the case that C
I
m(p¯) m
CIm(p¯
′) according to pm. In other words, the worst possible outcome for m when acting
truthfully (i.e., according to pm) at n is no worse than the best possible outcome for
m when misrepresenting his preference list to be p′m at n.
2. I is said to be obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if it is obviously strategy-proof for every
man m ∈M .
Li (2017) shows that obviously strategy-proof mechanisms are, in a precise sense, mech-
anisms that can shown to implement strategy-proof rules under a cognitively limited proof
model that does not allow for contingent reasoning. To observe how strategy-proofness of
the matching rule CI for a man m ∈M is indeed a weaker condition than obvious strategy-
proofness of the mechanism I for m, note that the matching rule CI is strategy-proof for m
if and only if for every node n with Q(n) = m and for every p¯ = (pm)m∈M ∈ P(W )M that
passes through n and for every p′m ∈ P(W ) that diverges from pm at n,10 it is the case that
CIm(p¯) m CIm(p′m, p¯−m) according to pm.11
Definition 4 (OSP-implementability). A (one-side-querying) matching rule C : P(W )M →
M is said to be OSP-implementable if C = CI for some obviously strategy-proof matching
mechanism I. In this case, we say that I OSP-implements C.
10These conditions imply that (p′m, p¯−m) also passes through n.
11We emphasize that this rephrased definition is equivalent to the definition of strategy-proofness of the
matching rule CI that is given in Section 2.1, however it is not equivalent to standard definition of strategy-
proofness of the extensive-form game underlying the mechanism I, which would allow each man to condition
the type he is “pretending to be” under any strategy on the information revealed by other men in preceding
nodes. Once we move to the realm of obvious strategy-proofness, the restriction on each strategy to always
consistently “pretend to be” of the same type is inconsequential, as the definition of OSP considers the case
in which other men may play different types when the man in question acts truthfully or deviates. It is
for this reason that we have chosen to implicitly define a strategy in the extensive-form game underlying I
to be restricted to consistently “pretending to be” of the same type. This somewhat nonstandard implicit
definition of a strategy considerably simplifies notation throughout this paper (by considering only consistent
behavior on behalf of every agent) without changing the mathematical meaning of obvious strategy-proofness
(or of strategy-proofness of a matching rule) and without limiting the generality of our results.
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2.3 Stability
We proceed to describe a simplified version of stability in matching markets as introduced
by Gale and Shapley (1962). While, as stated in Section 2.1, for the bulk of our analysis
it is sufficient to consider markets in which only men are strategic, to define the notion of
stability one must consider not only preferences for the (strategic) men, but also preferences
(sometimes called priorities) for the (nonstrategic) women. Women’s preference lists and
preference profiles are defined analogously with those of men. We continue to denote a
preference profile for men by p¯ = (pm)m∈M ∈ P(W )M , while denoting a preference profile
for women by q¯ = (qw)m∈M ∈ P(M)W .
Let p¯ and q¯ be preference profiles of men and women respectively. A matching µ is said to
be unstable with respect to p¯ and q¯ if there exist a man m and a woman w each preferring the
other over the partner matched to them by µ, or if some participant a ∈M ∪W is matched
with some other participant not on a’s preference list. A matching that is not unstable is
said to be stable. Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that a stable matching exists with respect
to every pair of preference profiles and, furthermore, that for every pair of preference profiles
there exists an M-optimal stable matching, i.e., a stable matching such that each man weakly
prefers his match in this stable matching over his match in any other stable matching.
We now relate the concept of stability to the (one-side-querying) matching rules and
mechanisms defined in the previous sections. Let q¯ ∈ P(M)W be a preference profile for W
over M . A (one-side-querying) matching rule C is said to be q¯-stable if for every preference
profile p¯ ∈ P(W )M for M over W , the matching C(p¯) is stable with respect to p¯ and q¯. A
(one-side-querying) matching mechanism is said to be q¯-stable if the matching rule that it
implements is q¯-stable.
We denote by C q¯ : P(W )M →M the M-optimal stable matching rule, i.e., the (one-side-
querying, q¯-stable) matching rule mapping each preference profile for men p¯ to the M -optimal
stable matching with respect to p¯ and q¯. It is well known that C q¯ is strategy-proof for all
men (Dubins and Freedman, 1981). Moreover, no other matching rule is strategy-proof for
all men (Gale and Sotomayor, 1985).12 In the notation of this paper:
Theorem 1 (Gale and Sotomayor, 1985; Chen et al., 2016). For every preference profile
q¯ ∈ P(M)W for W over M , no q¯-stable matching rule C 6= C q¯ is strategy-proof.
In this paper, we ask whether C q¯ is not only strategy-proof, but also OSP-implementable.
(As it is the unique strategy-proof q¯-stable matching rule, it is the only candidate for OSP-
implementability.)
3 OSP-implementable special cases
Before stating our main impossibility result, we first present a few special cases in which
C q¯, the M -optimal stable matching rule for a fixed women’s preference profile q¯, is in fact
OSP-implementable. These are the first known OSP mechanisms without transfers that are
not dictatorial.13
12For a more general result, see Chen et al. (2016).
13All OSP mechanisms that are surveyed in the end of the introduction are based upon the query structure
of the mechanisms of this section.
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For simplicity, we describe all of these cases under the assumption that the market is
balanced (i.e., that |W | = |M |) and that all preference lists are full (i.e., that each participant
prefers being matched to anyone over being unmatched); generalizing each of the below cases
for unbalanced markets or for preference lists for men that are not full is straightforward.14
The first case we consider is that in which women’s preferences are perfectly aligned.
Example 1 (C q¯ is OSP-implementable when women’s preferences are perfectly aligned).
Let q ∈ P(M) and let q¯ = (q)w∈W be the preference profile for W over M in which all
women share the same preference list q. C q¯ is OSP-implementable by the following serial
dictatorship mechanism: ask the man most preferred according to q¯ which woman he prefers
most, and assign that woman to this man (in all leaves of the subtree corresponding to this
response), ask the man second-most preferred according to q¯ which woman he prefers most
out of those not yet assigned to any man, and assign that woman to this man (in all leaves of
the subtree corresponding to this response), etc. This mechanism can be shown to be OSP
by the same reasoning that Li (2017) uses to show that serial dictatorship is OSP.
Another noteworthy example is that of arbitrary preferences in a very small matching
market.
Example 2 (C q¯ is OSP-implementable when |M | = |W | = 2). When |M | = |W | = 2, C q¯
is OSP-implementable for every preference profile q¯ ∈ P(M)W for W over M . Indeed, let
M = {a, b} and W = {x, y}. If qx = qy, then C q¯ is OSP-implementable as explained in
Example 1. Otherwise, without loss of generality a x b and b y a; for this case, Figure 1
describes an OSP mechanism that implements C q¯.
a b
a⇐ x
b ⇐ y
a⇐ x
b ⇐ y
a⇐ y
b⇐ x
x a y
y a x
y b x
x b y
Figure 1: An OSP mechanism that implements C q¯ for |W | = |M | = 2 and for q¯ where a x b
and b y a. (The notation, e.g., a ⇐ x, indicates that x is matched to a in the matching
corresponding to that leaf of the mechanism tree.)
The preference profiles in Examples 1 and 2 are special cases of the class of acyclical
preference profiles, whose structure was defined by Ergin (2002).
14Indeed, asking any man whether he prefers being unmatched over being matched with any (remaining
not-yet-matched) woman never violates obvious strategy-proofness.
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Definition 5 (acyclicality). A preference profile q¯ ∈ P(M)W for W over M is said to be
cyclical if there exist a, b, c ∈ M and x, y ∈ W such that a x b x c y a. If q¯ is not
cyclical, then it is said to be acyclical.
Ergin (2002) shows that acyclicality of q¯ is necessary and sufficient for C q¯ to be strongly
group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. We now generalize Examples 1 and 2 by showing
that acyclicality of q¯ (as in both of these examples) is sufficient for C q¯ to be also OSP-
implementable. Much like the implementations in Examples 1 and 2, the strategy-proofness
of the OSP implementation that emerges for acyclical preferences is far easier to understand
than that of the standard deferred-acceptance implementation, thus showcasing the useful-
ness of obvious strategy-proofness in identifying easy-to-understand implementations. In
each mechanism step, either a single man is given free pick out of all remaining w ∈ W , or
two men are each given first priority over some subset of W (i.e., free pick if his favorite
remaining w ∈ W is there), and second priority over the rest (i.e., free pick out of all other
remaining w ∈ W except the one chosen by the other man if the latter invoked his first
priority).
Theorem 2 (positive result for acyclical preferences). C q¯ is OSP-implementable for every
acyclical preference profile q¯ ∈ P(M)W for W over M .
Proof. We prove the result by induction over |M | = |W |. By acyclicality, at most two men
are ranked by some woman as her top choice. If only one such man m ∈ M exists, then he
is ranked by all women as their top choice—in this case, similarly to Example 1, we ask this
man for his top choice w ∈ W , assign her to him, and then continue by induction (finding in
an OSP manner the M -optimal stable matching between M \{m} and W \{w}). Otherwise,
there are precisely two men a ∈ M and b ∈ M who are ranked by some woman as her top
choice. By acyclicality, each woman either has a as her top choice and b as her second-best
choice, or vice versa.15 We conclude somewhat similarly to Figure 1: for each woman w ∈ W
that prefers a most, we ask a whether he prefers w most; if so, we assign w to a and continue
by induction. Otherwise, for each woman w ∈ W that prefers b most, we ask b whether he
prefers w most; if so, we assign w to b and continue by induction. Otherwise, we ask each of
a and b for his top choice, assign each of them his top choice, and continue by induction.
To see that this implementation is OSP, consider a man m ∈ M who is asked by this
mechanism whether a woman w ∈ W is his top choice (among the remaining women). If
m really does prefer w most, then answering truthfully matches him to w, which he weakly
prefers over any outcome that occurs if he is not truthful. Similarly, if m does not prefer w
most, then answering truthfully may get m a more preferred choice, but also assures m
that if he does not get such a preferred choice, then he would still be able to choose to get
matched to w (he would do so if he fails to get his top choice, and w is his second-best); so,
any outcome that results from truthfulness is weakly preferred by m over any outcome that
results from nontruthfulness in this case as well.
We conclude this section by noting, however, that acyclicality of q¯ is not a necessary
condition for OSP-implementability of C q¯, as demonstrated by the following example.
15This is reminiscent of the priorities of the first two agents in bipolar serially dictatorial rules (Bogomolnaia
et al., 2005), which are indeed included in the analysis of Theorem 2 as a special case.
9
Example 3 (OSP-implementable C q¯ with cyclical q¯). Let M = {a, b, c} and W = {x, y, z}.
We claim that C q¯, for the following cyclical preference profile q¯ for W over M (where each
woman prefers being matched to any man over being unmatched), is OSP-implementable:
a x b x c
a y c y b
b z a z c.
We begin by noting that q¯ is indeed cyclical, as a y c y b z a. We now note that the
following mechanism OSP-implements C q¯:
1. Ask a whether he prefers x the most; if so, assign x to a and continue as in Example 2
(finding in an OSP manner the M -optimal stable matching between {y, z} and {b, c}).
2. Ask a whether he prefers y the most; if so, assign y to a and continue as in Example 2.
(Otherwise, we deduce that 1) a prefers z the most and therefore 2) c will not end
up being matched to z.)
3. Ask b whether he prefers z the most; if so, assign z to b and continue as in Example 2.
4. Ask b whether he prefers x the most; if so, assign x to b, z to a, and y to c. (Otherwise,
we deduce that b prefers y the most.)
5. Ask c whether he prefers x over y. If so, assign x to c, y to b, and z to a. (Otherwise,
we deduce that b will not end up being matched to y.)
6. Ask b whether he prefers z over x. Assign b to his preferred choice between z and x
and continue as in Example 2.
Nonetheless, as we show in the next section, when there are more than 2 participants on
each side and women’s preferences are sufficiently unaligned, C q¯ is not OSP-implementable.
4 Impossibility result for general preferences
We now present our main impossibility result.
Theorem 3 (impossibility result for general preferences). If |M | ≥ 3 and |W | ≥ 3, then
there exists a preference profile q¯ ∈ P(M)W for W over M , such that no q¯-stable (one-side-
querying) matching rule is OSP-implementable.
Observe that Theorem 3 applies to any q¯-stable (one-side-querying) matching rule, and
not only to the M -optimal stable matching rule C q¯. Before proving the result, we first prove
a special case that cleanly demonstrates the construction underlying our proof.
Lemma 1. For |M | = |W | = 3, there exists a preference profile q¯ ∈ P(M)W for W over M
such that no q¯-stable (one-side-querying) matching rule is OSP-implementable.
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Proof. Let M = {a, b, c} and W = {x, y, z}. Let q¯ be the following preference profile (where
each woman prefers being matched to any man over being unmatched):
a x b x c
b y c y a
c z a z b.
(1)
Assume for contradiction that an OSP mechanism I that implements a q¯-stable matching
rule CI exists. Therefore, CI is strategy-proof, and so, by Theorem 1, CI = C q¯. In order to
reach a contradiction by showing that such a mechanism (that OSP-implements C q¯) cannot
possibly exist, we dramatically restrict the domain of preferences of all men, which results
in a simpler mechanism, where the contradiction can be identified in a less cumbersome
manner. We define:
p1a , z  y  x p1b , x  z  y p1c , y  x  z
p2a , y  x  z p2b , z  y  x p2c , x  z  y,
and set Pa , {p1a, p2a}, Pb , {p1b , p2b}, and Pc , {p1c , p2c}.
Following the “pruning” technique in Li (2017), we note that if we “prune” the tree of I
by replacing, for each edge e, the predicate A(e) with the conjunction (i.e., set intersection)
of A(e) with the predicate matching all elements of PQ(n), where n is the source node of e,
and by consequently deleting all edges e for which A(e) = ⊥,16 we obtain, in a precise sense,
a mechanism that implements C q¯ where the preference list of each man m ∈ M is a priori
restricted to be in Pm.17 By a proposition in Li (2017), since the original mechanism I is
OSP, so is the pruned mechanism as well.
Let n be the earliest (i.e., closest to the root) node in the pruned tree that has more
than one outgoing edge (such a node clearly exists, since CI = C q¯ is not constant over
Pa × Pb × Pc). By symmetry of q¯,Pa,Pb,Pc, without loss of generality Q(n) = a. By
definition of pruning, it must be the case that n has two outgoing edges, one labeled p1a,
and the other labeled p2a. We claim that the mechanism of the pruned tree is in fact not
OSP. Indeed, for pa = p
2
a (the “true preferences”), pb = p
2
b , and pc = p
1
c , we have that
CIa (p¯) = C
q¯
a(p¯) = x, yet for p
′
a = p
1
a (a “possible manipulation”), p
′
b = p
1
b , and p
′
c = p
2
c ,
we have that CIa (p¯
′) = C q¯a(p¯
′) = y, even though CIa (p¯
′) = y a x = CIa (p¯) according to pa
(by definition of n, both p¯ and p¯′ pass through n, and pa and p′a diverge at n), and so the
mechanism of the pruned tree indeed is not OSP — a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3. The theorem follows from a reduction to Lemma 1. Indeed, let a, b, c be
three distinct men and let x, y, z be three distinct women. Let q¯ ∈ P(W )M be a preference
profile such that the preferences of x, y, z satisfy Equation (1) with respect to a, b, c (with
arbitrary preferences over all other men), and with arbitrary preferences for all other women.
Assume for contradiction that a q¯-stable OSP mechanism I exists.
16The standard notation ⊥ stands for “false” (mnemonic: an upside-down “true” >), i.e., the predicate
that matches nothing, so an edge for which A(e) = ⊥ will never be followed.
17The definition of mechanisms and OSP when the domain of preferences is restricted extends naturally
from that given in Section 2.2 for unrestricted preferences. The interested reader is referred to Appendix A
for precise details.
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We prune (see the proof of Lemma 1 for an explanation of pruning) the tree of I such
that the only possible preference lists for a, b, c are those in which they prefer each of x, y, z,
over all other women, and the only possible preference list for all other men is empty.18 Let
q¯′ be the preference profile given in Lemma 1; the resulting (pruned) mechanism is a q¯′-stable
matching mechanism for a, b, c over x, y, z,19 and so, by Lemma 1, it is not OSP; therefore,
by the same proposition in Li (2017) that is used in Lemma 1, neither is I.
As Theorem 3 shows, it is enough that some three women have preferences that satisfy
Equation (1) with respect to some three men in order for obvious strategy-proofness to
be unattainable. This implies that obvious strategy-proofness in also unattainable in large
random markets with high probability.
Corollary 1 (impossibility result for random markets). If |M | ≥ 3 and |W | ≥ 3, then as
|M | + |W | grows, we have for a randomly drawn preference profile q¯ ∼ U(P(M)W ) for W
over M that:20
a. With high probability no q¯-stable (one-side-querying) matching rule is OSP-imple-
mentable.
b. For every three distinct men a, b, c ∈M , as |W | grows, with high probability no q¯-stable
(one-side-querying) matching mechanism is OSP for a, b, and c.
c. If |M | ≤ poly(|W |), then with high probability no q¯-stable (one-side-querying) matching
mechanism is OSP for more than two men.
Corollary 1 follows from an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.
Indeed, our proof of Theorem 3 in fact shows that if q¯ satisfies Equation (1) with respect
to three men a, b, c and three women x, y, z, then no q¯-stable matching mechanism is OSP
for a, b, and c. For Part c, for instance, we note that for a fixed triplet of distinct men
a, b, c ∈M , the probability that Equation (1) is not satisfied by q¯ with respect to a, b, c and
any three women x, y, z decreases exponentially with |W |, while the number of triplets of
men increases polynomially with |M |.
We conclude this section by noting that while the aesthetic preference profile defined in
Equation (1) is sufficient for proving Theorem 3 and even Corollary 1, it is by no means
the unique preference profile that eludes an obviously strategy-proof implementation, even
when |M | = |W | = 3. Indeed, Proposition 1 in Appendix B gives an additional example of
such a preference profile, which could be described as “less cyclical,” in some sense.21 In this
context, it is worth noting that following up on our paper, Troyan (2016) gives a necessary
and sufficient condition, “weak acyclicality” (weaker, indeed, than acyclicality as defined in
Definition 5), on the preferences of objects in the (Pareto efficient, not necessarily stable)
18Alternatively, one could set for all other men arbitrary preference lists that do not contain x, y, z.
19Formally, it is a matching mechanism for W over M with respect to the pruned preferences, but can
be shown to always leave all participants but a, b, c and x, y, z, unmatched, and so can be thought of as a
matching mechanism for a, b, c over x, y, z.
20This result also holds, with the same proof, if q¯ is drawn uniformly at random from the set of all full
preferences (i.e., where each woman prefers being matched to any man over being unmatched).
21While the proof of Proposition 1 also follows a pruning argument, the reasoning is more involved than
in the proof given for Lemma 1 above.
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top trading cycles algorithm for this algorithm to be OSP-implementable for the agents.
The example given in Proposition 1 also demonstrates that Troyan’s condition does not
suffice for the existence of an OSP-implementable stable mechanism. A comparison of the
respective preference profiles used for the positive result of Example 3 and the negative result
of Proposition 1, noting that the former is obtained by taking the latter and arguably making
it “more aligned” by modifying the preference list of woman x to equal that of woman y,
suggests that an analogous succinct “maximal domain” characterization of preference profiles
that admit OSP-implementable stable mechanisms may be delicate, and obtaining it may
be challenging.
5 Matching with two strategic sides
So far, this paper has studied two-sided matching markets in which only men are strategic
and women’s preference lists are commonly known. This allowed us to ask questions such
as, for which preference profiles of women one can OSP-implement the M -optimal stable
matching rule? This setting is furthermore practically relevant in school choice where, for
example, schools do not act strategically but have priorities over students.
Our analysis, however, also immediately yields that when both men and women be-
have strategically, no stable matching mechanism is OSP-implementable. To formalize this
result, we introduce a few definitions. A two-sides-querying matching rule is a function
C : P(W )M ×P(M)W →M, from preference profiles for both men and women to a match-
ing between M and W . A two-sides-querying matching rule C is stable if for any preference
profiles p¯ and q¯ for men and women, C(p¯, q¯) is stable with respect to p¯ and q¯. A two-
sides-querying matching mechanism22 is stable if the two-sides-querying matching rule that
it implements is stable. Theorem 3 implies the following impossibility result for two-sides-
querying matching mechanisms:
Corollary 2 (impossibility result for two-sides-querying mechanisms). If |M | ≥ 3 and |W | ≥
3, then no stable two-sides-querying matching rule is OSP-implementable for M . Moreover,
no stable two-sides-querying matching mechanism is OSP for more than two men.
As with Theorem 3, we note that Corollary 2 applies to any stable two-sides-querying
matching rule, and not only to the M-optimal two-side-querying stable matching rule (i.e.,
the two-sides-querying matching rule that maps each pair of preference profiles to the corre-
sponding M -optimal stable matching). Similarly, Theorem 2 implies the following possibility
result for two-sides-querying matching mechanisms:
Corollary 3 (positive result for |M | = 2 for two-sides-querying mechanisms). If |M | = 2,
then the two-sides-querying M-optimal stable matching rule is OSP-implementable (by first
querying the women, and then, given their preferences, continuing as in Theorem 2).
A precise argument that relates the results for markets with one strategic side and those for
markets with two strategic sides is given in Appendix D.
22The definition of mechanisms and OSP for markets where both sides are strategic extends naturally from
that given in Section 2.2 for markets where only one side is strategic. The interested reader is referred to
Appendix C for precise details.
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6 Discussion
This paper finds that no stable matching mechanism is obviously strategy-proof for the
participants even on one of the sides of the market. This suggests that there may not be
any alternative way to describe the deferred acceptance procedure that makes its strategy-
proofness more apparent, implying that strategic mistakes observed in practice (Chen and
So¨nmez, 2006; Rees-Jones, 2016; Hassidim et al., 2016; Shorrer and So´va´go´, 2017) may not
be avoidable by better explaining the mechanism. This highlights the importance of gaining
the trust of the agents who participate in stable mechanisms, so that they both act as advised
(even when it is hard to verify that no strategic opportunities exist) and are assured that the
social planner will not deviate from the prescribed procedure after preferences are elicited.
For the case in which women’s preferences are acyclical, we describe an OSP mecha-
nism that implements the men-optimal stable matching. As may be expected, the strategy-
proofness of this OSP implementation is easier to understand than that of deferred accep-
tance. It is interesting to compare and contrast this mechanism with OSP mechanisms for
auctions. In binary allocation problems, such as private-value auctions with unit demand,
procurement auctions with unit supply, and binary public good problems, Li (2017) shows
that in every OSP mechanism, each buyer chooses, roughly speaking, between a fixed option
(i.e., quitting) and a “moving” option that is worsening over time (i.e., its price is increasing).
In contrast, in the OSP mechanism that we construct for the men-optimal stable matching
with acyclical women’s preferences, each man m either is assigned his (current) top choice
or chooses between a fixed option (i.e., being unmatched) and a “moving” option that is
improving over time: choosing any woman who prefers m most among all yet-to-be-matched
men. This novel construction has come to be utilized by various OSP implementations, such
as all of those that are surveyed in the end of the introduction.
Bridging the negative and positive results via an exact, succinct characterization of how
aligned the preference profile of the proposed-to side needs to be in order to support an
obviously strategy-proof implementation remains an open question. A comparison of the
respective preference profiles used for the positive result of Example 3 and the negative
result of Proposition 1 (in Appendix B) suggests that such a succinct “maximal domain”
characterization may be delicate, and obtaining it may be challenging.23
Interestingly, while deferred acceptance is weakly group strategy-proof and has an as-
cending flavor similar to that of ascending unit-demand auctions or clock auctions (which
are all obviously strategy-proof), deferred acceptance is in fact not OSP-implementable. It
seems that the fact that stability is a two-sided objective (concerning the preferences of
agents on both sides of the market), in contrast with maximizing efficiency or welfare for
one side, increases the difficulty of employing strategic reasoning over stable mechanisms.
In this context, it is worth noting a line of work (Segal, 2007; Gonczarowski et al., 2015)
that highlights a similar message in terms of complexity rather than strategic reasoning,
by showing that the communication complexity (measured in the number of messages) of
finding, or even verifying, an approximately stable matching is significantly higher than the
communication complexity of approximate welfare maximization for one of the sides of the
23While a technical challenge, we find it unlikely that resolving this problem will yield interesting economic
insights.
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market (Dobzinski et al., 2014). Indeed, in more than one way, stability is not an “obvious”
objective.
While direct-revelation stable mechanisms are ubiquitous, there is growing usage of
sequential-like implementations of deferred acceptance (or close variations thereof).24 Our
results imply that none of these variants, however presented to students and however con-
ducted, can be OSP. Moreover, when DA is implemented sequentially according to its tradi-
tional description, sincere behavior is no longer even a dominant strategy but only induces an
ex-post equilibrium (Bo´ and Hakimov, 2016a).25 Nonetheless, seemingly contrasting these
theoretical results, experimental evidence shows that such a sequential implementation of
DA leads more often to sincere behavior and stable outcomes than the static implementation
(Bo´ and Hakimov, 2016b; Pais et al., 2016). While sequential-like implementations do not
possess stronger incentive properties than static implementations (and sometimes even pos-
sess weaker incentive properties), sequential-like implementations do ease the cognitive tasks
of participants in various ways: they simplify strategic interactions by allowing students to
break-down their decisions into smaller decisions that each requires somewhat less contingent
reasoning than in the static implementation (as it is taken after receiving more information
and feedback, such as the updated cutoff at each college); they allow students to focus
on their next choice rather than to dwell on tentative choices that may never be reached;
and they reduce the necessary preference communication and preference learning due to the
information that is released throughout the mechanism (Bo´ and Hakimov, 2016a; Ashlagi
et al., 2017a). Our findings formally demonstrate the cognitive complexity of reasoning in
stable mechanisms; this suggests a possible explanation as to why, within the context of
such mechanisms, the benefits from reducing cognitive load that are offered by sequential
implementations outweigh the negative effects of the slightly weaker incentive properties of
these implementations.26 In a sense, in the absence of an OSP mechanism to reduce the
cognitive load while strengthening the incentive properties, the “next best thing” may well
be an extensive-form mechanism that eases cognitive load in different manners than OSP
mechanisms, and moreover gives students a “feeling” similar to that of OSP mechanisms by
not relinquishing control to the mechanism and by being able to constantly witness that the
mechanism is run as promised.27
24These include college admissions in Brazil (Bo´ and Hakimov, 2016a), Inner Mongolia (Chen and Pereyra,
2015; Gong and Liang, 2016), and Tunisia (Luflade, 2017), and school choice in Wake County (Dur et al.,
2018). These implementations differ in various dimensions including the type of information provided to
students, the timing, and how students can revise their choices; such differences may very well impact the
students’ behavior and therefore the outcome.
25Bo´ and Hakimov (2016a) require that only rejected agents may revise their proposals at each step in
order to eliminate possible manipulations that appeared in the mechanism for college admissions in Brazil.
26The impact on students’ welfare (which is of major importance) is beyond the scope of this paper, but
see, for example, Luflade (2017); Dur et al. (2018).
27For a recent definition of a very strong sense of witnessing that the mechanism is run as promised, see
Akbarpour and Li (2017).
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A Mechanisms with restricted domains
In this appendix, we explicitly adapt the definitions in Section 2.2 to a restricted domain
of preferences, as used in the proof of Lemma 1. The differences from the definitions in
Section 2.2 are marked with an underscore. We emphasize that these definitions, like those
in Section 2.2, are also a special case of the definitions in Li (2017). For every m ∈M , fix a
subset Pm ⊆ P(W ). Furthermore, define P ,×m∈M Pm.
Definition 6 (matching mechanism). A (one-side-querying extensive-form) matching mech-
anism for M over W with respect to P consists of:
1. A rooted tree T .
2. A map X : L(T )→M(M,W ) from the leaves of T to matchings between M and W .
3. A map Q : V (T ) \ L(T )→M , from internal nodes of T to M .
4. A map A : E(T ) → 2P(W ), from edges of T to predicates over P(W ), such that all of
the following hold:
• Each such predicate must match at least one element in P(W ).
• The predicates corresponding to edges outgoing from the same node are disjoint.
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• The disjunction (i.e., set union) of all predicates corresponding to edges outgoing
from a node n equals the predicate corresponding to the last edge outgoing from a
node labeled Q(n) along the path from the root to n, or to the predicate matching
all elements of PQ(n) if no such edge exists.28
A preference profile p¯ ∈ P is said to pass through a node n ∈ V (T ) if, for each edge e
along the path from the root of T to n, it is the case that pQ(n′) ∈ A(e), where n′ is the
source node of e. That is, the nodes through which p¯ passes are the nodes of the path that
starts from the root of T and follows, from each internal node n′ that it reaches, the unique
outgoing edge whose predicate matches the preference list of Q(n′).
Definition 7 (implemented matching rule). Given an extensive-form matching mechanism I
with respect to P , we denote by CI , called the matching rule implemented by I, the (one-
side-querying) matching rule mapping a preference profile p¯ ∈ P to the matching X(n),
where n is the unique leaf through which p¯ passes. Equivalently, n is the node in T obtained
by traversing T from its root, and from each internal node n′ that is reached, following the
unique outgoing edge whose predicate matches the preference list of Q(n′).
Two preference lists p, p′ ∈ P(W ) are said to diverge at a node n ∈ V (T ) if there exist
two distinct edges e, e′ outgoing from n such that p ∈ A(e) and p′ ∈ A(e′).29
Definition 8 (obvious strategy-proofness (OSP)). Let I be an extensive-form matching
mechanism with respect to P .
1. I is said to be obviously strategy-proof (OSP) for a man m ∈ M if for every node
n with Q(n) = m and for every p¯ = (pm′)m′∈M ∈ P and p¯′ = (p′m′)m′∈M ∈ P that
both pass through n such that pm and p
′
m diverge at n, it is the case that C
I
m(p¯) m
CIm(p¯
′) according to pm. In other words, the worst possible outcome for m when acting
truthfully (i.e., according to pm) at n is no worse than the best possible outcome for
m when misrepresenting his preference list to be p′m at n.
2. I is said to be obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if it is obviously strategy-proof for every
man m ∈M .
B A “less cyclical” non-OSP-implementable example
In this appendix, we give an additional example of a preference profile q¯ ∈ P(M)W , for three
women over three men, for which no q¯-stable matching rule is OSP-implementable. This
preference profile could be described, in some sense, as “less cyclical” than the one used
above to drive the proof of the results of Section 4. (Indeed, as noted above, this non-OSP-
implementable preference profile is obtained by taking the OSP-implementable preference
profile from Example 3 and arguably making it “more aligned” by modifying the preference
list of woman x to equal that of woman y.) While, similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, we
28In particular, this implies that the predicates corresponding to edges outgoing from a node n are predi-
cates over PQ(n).
29In particular, this implies that p, p′ ∈ PQ(n).
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show the impossibility of OSP-implementation of this example via a pruning argument, the
reasoning in this argument is more involved than in the one in the proof given for Lemma 1
in Section 4.
Proposition 1. For |M | = |W | = 3, no OSP mechanism implements a q¯-stable (one-side-
querying) matching rule, for the following preference profile q¯ ∈ P(M)W for M over W
(where each woman prefers being matched to any man over being unmatched):
a x c x b
a y c y b
b z a z c.
Proof. The proof starts similarly to that of Lemma 1. Let M = {a, b, c} and W = {x, y, z}.
Let q¯ be the above preference profile, and assume for contradiction that an OSP mechanism I
that implements a q¯-stable matching rule CI exists. Therefore, CI is strategy-proof, and
so, by Theorem 1, CI = C q¯. In order to reach a contradiction we dramatically restrict the
domain of preferences of all men, however in this proof to a slightly richer domain than in
the proof of Lemma 1. We define:
p1a , z  x  y p1b , y  z  x p1c , x  y  z
p2a , z  y  x p2b , x  z  y p2c , y  x  z,
p3b , x  y  z
and set Pa , {p1a, p2a}, Pb , {p1b , p2b , p3b}, and Pc , {p1c , p2c}.
Following a proof technique in Li (2017), we prune (see the proof of Lemma 1 for more
details) the tree of I according to Pa,Pb,Pc, to obtain a mechanism that implements C q¯
where the preference list of each man m ∈ M is a priori restricted to be in Pm. By a
proposition in Li (2017), since the original mechanism I is OSP, so is the pruned mechanism
as well.
Let n be the earliest (i.e., closest to the root) node in the pruned tree that has more than
one outgoing edge (such a node clearly exists, since CI = C q¯ is not constant over Pa×Pb×Pc).
While the lack of symmetry of q¯ does requires a slightly longer argument compared to the
proof of Lemma 1 to complete this proof (reasoning by cases according to Q(n) below), what
makes the reasoning in this argument more involved (see the reasoning in the case Q(n) = b
below) than in its counterpart in the proof of Lemma 1 is the fact that we have left possible
three preference lists for man b.30 We conclude the proof by reasoning by cases according to
the identity of Q(n), in each case obtaining a contradiction by showing that the pruned tree
is in fact not OSP.
Q(n) = a By definition of pruning, it must be the case that n has two outgoing edges, one
labeled p1a, and the other labeled p
2
a. In this case, for pa = p
1
a (the “true preferences”),
pb = p
1
b , and pc = p
2
c , we have that C
I
a (p¯) = C
q¯
a(p¯) = x, yet for p
′
a = p
2
a (a “possible
30To our knowledge, the first instance of an impossibility-by-pruning proof with more than two possible
preference lists/types for any of the agents is in an impossibility result for OSP-implementation of combina-
torial auctions in Bade and Gonczarowski (2017). While that paper is much newer than any other result in
our paper, the first draft of that proof predated the proof given in this appendix.
20
manipulation”), p′b = p
2
b , and p
′
c = p
2
c , we have that C
I
a (p¯
′) = C q¯a(p¯
′) = z, even though
CIa (p¯
′) = z a x = CIa (p¯) according to pa (by definition of n, both p¯ and p¯′ pass
through n, and pa and p
′
a diverge at n), and so the mechanism of the pruned tree
indeed is not OSP — a contradiction.
Q(n) = c By definition of pruning, it must be the case that n has two outgoing edges, one
labeled p1c , and the other labeled p
2
c . In this case, for pc = p
1
c (the “true preferences”),
pa = p
1
a, and pb = p
2
b , we have that C
I
c (p¯) = C
q¯
c (p¯) = y, yet for p
′
c = p
2
c (a “possible
manipulation”), p′a = p
2
a, and p
′
b = p
1
b , we have that C
I
c (p¯
′) = C q¯c (p¯
′) = x, even though
CIc (p¯
′) = x c y = CIc (p¯) according to pc (by definition of n, both p¯ and p¯′ pass
through n, and pc and p
′
c diverge at n), and so the mechanism of the pruned tree
indeed is not OSP — a contradiction.
Q(n) = b By definition of pruning, it must be the case that n has at least two outgoing edges,
and therefore has at least one edge labeled by a singleton preference list pib. We prove
this case by reasoning by subcases according to the value of i.
i=1 In this case, for pb = p
i
b = p
1
b (the “true preferences”), pa = p
1
a, and pc = p
2
c ,
we have that CIb (p¯) = C
q¯
b (p¯) = z, yet for p
′
b = p
3
b (a “possible manipulation”),
p′a = p
1
a, and p
′
c = p
1
c , we have that C
I
b (p¯
′) = C q¯b (p¯
′) = y, even though CIb (p¯
′) =
y b z = CIb (p¯) according to pb (by definition of n, both p¯ and p¯′ pass through n,
and since i = 1 we have that pb = p
i
b and p
′
b 6= pib diverge at n), and so the
mechanism of the pruned tree indeed is not OSP — a contradiction.
i=2 In this case, for pb = p
i
b = p
2
b (the “true preferences”), pa = p
2
a, and pc = p
1
c ,
we have that CIb (p¯) = C
q¯
b (p¯) = z, yet for p
′
b = p
3
b (a “possible manipulation”),
p′a = p
1
a, and p
′
c = p
2
c , we have that C
I
b (p¯
′) = C q¯b (p¯
′) = x, even though CIb (p¯
′) =
x b z = CIb (p¯) according to pb (by definition of n, both p¯ and p¯′ pass through n,
and since i = 2 we have that pb = p
i
b and p
′
b 6= pib diverge at n), and so the
mechanism of the pruned tree indeed is not OSP — a contradiction.
i=3 In this case, for pb = p
i
b = p
3
b (the “true preferences”), pa = p
1
a, and pc = p
1
c ,
we have that CIb (p¯) = C
q¯
b (p¯) = y, yet for p
′
b = p
2
b (a “possible manipulation”),
p′a = p
1
a, and p
′
c = p
2
c , we have that C
I
b (p¯
′) = C q¯b (p¯
′) = x, even though CIb (p¯
′) =
x b y = CIb (p¯) according to pb (by definition of n, both p¯ and p¯′ pass through n,
and since i = 3 we have that pb = p
i
b and p
′
b 6= pib diverge at n), and so the
mechanism of the pruned tree indeed is not OSP — a contradiction.
C Two-sides-querying mechanisms
In this appendix, we explicitly adapt the definitions in Section 2.2 for two-sides-querying
mechanisms, where the (strategic) participants include not only the men but also the women,
as in Section 5. The differences from the definitions in Section 2.2 are marked with an
underscore. We emphasize that these definitions, like those in Section 2.2, are also a special
case of the definitions in Li (2017). Define P , P(W )M × P(M)W . For every two-sided
preference profile r¯ = (p¯, q¯) ∈ P , we write rm = pm for every m ∈ M and rw = qw for every
w ∈ W .
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Definition 9 (two-sides-querying matching mechanism). A two-sides-querying (extensive-
form) matching mechanism for M and W consists of:
1. A rooted tree T .
2. A map X : L(T )→M(M,W ) from the leaves of T to matchings between M and W .
3. A map Q : V (T ) \ L(T )→M ∪W , from internal nodes of T to participants M ∪W .
4. A map A : E(T ) → 2P(W ) ∪ 2P(M), from edges of T to predicates over P(W ) or over
P(M), such that all of the following hold:
• Each such predicate must match at least one element in P(W ) if Q(n) ∈ M and
at least one element in P(M) if Q(n) ∈ W .
• The predicates corresponding to edges outgoing from the same node are disjoint.
• The disjunction (i.e., set union) of all predicates corresponding to edges outgoing
from a node n equals the predicate corresponding to the last edge outgoing from
a node labeled Q(n) along the path from the root to n, or, if no such edge exists,
to the predicate matching all elements of P(W ) if Q(n) ∈ M and all elements of
P(M) if Q(n) ∈ W .31
A two-sides-querying preference profile r¯ ∈ P is said to pass through a node n ∈ V (T )
if, for each edge e along the path from the root of T to n, it is the case that rQ(n′) ∈ A(e),
where n′ is the source node of e. That is, the nodes through which r¯ passes are the nodes
of the path that starts from the root of T and follows, from each internal node n′ that it
reaches, the unique outgoing edge whose predicate matches the preference list of Q(n′).
Definition 10 (implemented matching rule). Given a two-sides-querying extensive-form
matching mechanism I, we denote by CI , called the two-sides-querying matching rule imple-
mented by I, the two-sides-querying matching rule mapping a two-sides-querying preference
profile r¯ ∈ P to the matching X(n), where n is the unique leaf through which r¯ passes.
Equivalently, n is the node in T obtained by traversing T from its root, and from each in-
ternal node n′ that is reached, following the unique outgoing edge whose predicate matches
the preference list of Q(n′).
Two preference lists r, r′ ∈ P(W )∪P(M) are said to diverge at a node n ∈ V (T ) if there
exist two distinct edges e, e′ outgoing from n such that r ∈ A(e) and r′ ∈ A(e′).32
Definition 11 (obvious strategy-proofness (OSP)). Let I be a two-sides-querying extensive-
form matching mechanism. I is said to be obviously strategy-proof (OSP) for a participant
a ∈M ∪W if for every node n with Q(n) = a and for every r¯, r¯′ ∈ P that both pass through
n such that pa and p
′
a diverge at n, it is the case that C
I
a (r¯) a CIa (r¯′) according to ra.
In other words, the worst possible outcome for a when acting truthfully (i.e., according to
ra) at n is no worse than the best possible outcome for a when misrepresenting his or her
preference list to be r′a at n.
31In particular, this implies that the predicates corresponding to edges outgoing from a node n are predi-
cates over P(W ) if Q(n) ∈M and over P(M) if Q(n) ∈W .
32In particular, this implies that r, r′ ∈ P(W ) if Q(n) ∈M and that r, r′ ∈ P(M) if Q(n) ∈W .
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Definition 12 (OSP-implementability). A two-sides-querying matching rule C : P →
M(M,W ) is said to be OSP-implementable for a set of participants A ⊆M ∪W if C = CI
for some two-sides-querying matching mechanism I that is OSP for (every participant in) A.
D From one strategic side to two strategic sides
The next lemma allows us to obtain results in the two-strategic-sides model from the results
obtained in the one-strategic-side model (as alluded to in the discussion opening Section 5,
the converse is not as immediate, e.g., neither Theorem 2 nor Corollary 1 is an immediate
corollary of results that are naturally stated for two-sides-querying mechanisms/matching
rules). Indeed, Corollaries 2 and 3 both follow via this lemma from the respective analogous
results for one-side-querying mechanisms/matching rules.
Lemma 2 (relation between one-side-querying and two-sides-querying OSP mechanisms).
For every M ′ ⊆M , there exists a stable two-sides-querying matching mechanism that is OSP
for M ′ if and only if for every q¯ ∈ P(W )M there exists a q¯-stable one-side-querying matching
mechanism that is OSP for M ′.
Proof. ⇒: Assume that there exists a stable two-sides-querying matching mechanism I that
is OSP for M ′, and let q¯ ∈ P(W )M . We prune (see the proof of Lemma 1 for an explanation
of pruning) the tree of I such that the women’s preference profile is fixed to be q¯. The
resulting (pruned) mechanism is a one-side-querying matching mechanism that is q¯-stable
and (by the same proposition in Li (2017) that is used in Lemma 1) OSP for M ′, as required.
⇐: Assume that for every q¯ ∈ P(M)W there exists a q¯-stable one-side-querying matching
mechanism I q¯ that is OSP for M ′. We construct a stable two-sides-querying matching
mechanism I as follows: first ask all women, in some order, for all of their preference lists;
the leaves of the tree so far are thus in one-to-one correspondence with preference profiles
q¯ ∈ P(M)W that pass through them. Next, at each “interim leaf” nq¯ corresponding to a
preference profile q¯ ∈ P(M)W (that passes through it), construct a subtree that is identical
to the tree of I q¯, with nq¯ as its root. It is straightforward to verify that the fact that each
I q¯ is q¯-stable and OSP for M ′ implies that I is stable and OSP for M ′.
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